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ABSTRACT:  
The recent policies of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, combined 
with the collapse of the Syrian state in 2011, created conditions that led to the rise of the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or “ISIS.”  As of November 2014, ISIS controls large 
areas of western and northern Iraq and northern and eastern Syria, an area roughly the 
size of Belgium. The rise of ISIS in the past three years has caught the attention of 
every major nation, especially the United States, and world leaders are justified in 
fearing a strong ISIS in the Middle East. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the US strategy in 
combating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The effectiveness of the United States 
strategy is closely linked with numerous factors, including the history of sectarian 
violence in Iraq. These factors will be explored throughout the paper. This analysis 
sheds light on the strengths and weaknesses of the US strategy and provides various 
ways the US can further its goals in the region.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The United States has been militarily engaged in Iraq for more than a decade. 
After the attacks carried out by al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001, the United States 
sought to eliminate the threat posed by militant Islamic organizations throughout the 
world. In 2003, US forces invaded Iraq based on intelligence reports suggesting that 
Saddam Hussein had developed weapons of mass destruction, or “WMD.” United 
States’ leaders, including President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld, believed that Hussein’s regime had ties with al-Qaeda and could provide the 
militant group with WMDs that could be used against the United States. The United 
States developed a “strategy” for dealing with this possible threat from Iraq, which 
consisted solely of a short-term plan to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime and prevent it 
from using WMD to threaten its neighbors and the United States’ interests in the 
region.1 Astonishingly, this war plan omitted any form of a strategy designed to 
successfully occupy Iraq after the combat phase and establish a viable government. This 
lack of a strategy and the misguided actions of US civilian and military leaders would 
prove disastrous.  
 In the early years of the invasion, the decisions of American political leaders 
inadvertently incited sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shia Muslims, and this 
sectarianism would fuel an insurgency against United States troops in Iraq. Radical 
jihadist groups would purposefully promote sectarian violence in order to achieve their 
objectives. During the past decade, sectarian violence has been the primary force 
undermining US foreign policy in Iraq. While US leaders made many decisions that 
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worsened sectarian violence, Americans have also pursued successful policies that 
worked to fight radical groups while easing sectarian tensions.  
Unfortunately, in recent years Iraqi political leaders have pursued blatant 
sectarian agendas that have worsened tensions. The recent policies of then-Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki, combined with the collapse of the Syrian state in 2011, 
created conditions that led to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or “ISIS.”  
As of November 2014, ISIS controls large areas of western and northern Iraq and 
northern and eastern Syria, an area roughly the size of Belgium.2 The rise of ISIS in the 
past three years has caught the attention of every major nation, especially the United 
States, and world leaders are justified in fearing a strong ISIS in the Middle East. 
Foreign fighters from around the world, including the United States, could be trained by 
ISIS and return to their countries to carry out terrorist attacks. The attacks by al-Qaeda 
on 9/11 demonstrate that only a small number of terrorists are capable of killing 
thousands of innocent civilians and damaging the world economy. 
ISIS also threatens the stability of the region. The group has expressed its 
intention to invade and conquer neighboring countries such as Jordan, Turkey, Kuwait 
and Iran and expand the “Caliphate,”3 or its Islamic empire. The spread of ISIS 
throughout the region poses a direct security threat to US allies such as Israel and would 
further strengthen the group, making it more capable of carrying out attacks on the 
United States. Given these threats, it is imperative that the United States addresses the 
problem of ISIS in the region. On September 10, 2014, President Barack Obama 
outlined the US strategy to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. In sum, this 
strategy consists of a US air campaign targeting ISIS forces. These airstrikes will 
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support Iraqi forces conducting offensive operations against ISIS positions. The United 
States also has 3,000 troops stationed throughout Iraq tasked with training and 
supplying Iraqi Security Forces. Finally, US is working with the Iraqi government to 
support the formation of Sunni National Guard units that will fight ISIS.4 
  This essay will analyze this strategy in terms of its effectiveness in defeating 
ISIS and reducing sectarian tensions in Iraq. Radical jihadist groups will be able to find 
safe haven in Iraq as long as there are deep sectarian divisions. The United States must 
use its leverage to compel the Iraqi government to pursue policies that reduce tensions 
between Sunni and Shia factions throughout the country. In the first chapter, I will 
explain the various threats posed by ISIS and argue that is imperative that the US works 
to diminish and ultimately destroy the group. In the next chapter, I will provide a 
history of sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia Muslims and its role in 
undermining US policy in Iraq. I will also examine the various approaches the United 
States has taken to fight radical Islamists while easing sectarian tensions. In the 
concluding chapter, I will analyze current US strategy for combating ISIS. This section 
will include policy recommendations aimed to degrade ISIS, reduce sectarianism, and 
facilitate reconciliation. I will only focus on actions the United States should take to 
drive ISIS out of Iraq, recognizing that for ISIS to be destroyed, they must be driven out 
of Syria as well. However, the United States and the Iraqi government must first drive 
ISIS out of Iraq and regain control over its lost territory. 
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II. THE THREAT FROM ISIS 
 In assessing the threat of ISIS to US security interests in the Middle East, it is 
imperative to understand the organization’s ideology and how it has driven their recent 
actions in Iraq and Syria. 
Brief History of Salafism 
 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria is a militant Sunni Salafi group, and Salafists 
are considered to be ultraconservative Sunnis. After the death of the Prophet 
Mohammed in 632 A.D, Muslims disagreed about who should be his successor. Sunni 
Muslims believe that the Muslim community can select the successor of Mohammed. 
The Shia believe that Mohammed chose his son-in-law, Ali, to be his successor and that 
therefore the successor must be a direct relative of the Prophet. This rift has divided the 
Muslim world across the Middle East for over a thousand years. While the vast majority 
of the world’s Muslims are Sunni, in Iraq Sunni Muslims are a minority, making up 
around 20 percent of the population. Shias are concentrated in Iran, southern Iraq and 
southern Lebanon, and have a significant presence in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf 
States.5 
 The traditional form of Salafism is an ultraconservative religious reform 
movement within Sunni Islam. The majority of Sunni Muslims around the world, 
approximately 90 percent of the Muslim population, view Salifism as too dated, 
literalist, and detached from mainstream modern Islam. Salafi followers represent 
around 3 percent of the world’s Muslims. Salafism is an ideology that posits that Islam 
has strayed from its origins and become polluted by modernity.6  Salafists want 
Muslims to adhere directly to Islam’s original texts and teachings, thereby returning to 
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the moral practices of the Prophet. However, until recently, Salafists held practical 
political positions and did not attempt to revolt against existing political authorities. In 
the mid-1990’s, some Salafists began to embrace “jihad,” or holy war in the name of 
Islam, believing that violence and terrorism were both justified and crucial to achieve 
their religious and political objectives. Since the “Arab Spring” of  2010-2011, various 
Jihadi groups have politicized and polarized the Salafi movement.7  
ISIS and Salafi Jihad 
 ISIS embodies this newly polarized and jihadist Salafism. Unlike traditional 
Salafists, ISIS acts on radical political goals as well as extreme religious views. The 
goal of ISIS is to recreate the Caliphate that existed following the death of the Prophet 
Mohammed in 632 A.D. A “caliphate” was the political-religious state comprising the 
Muslim community and the lands and people under its dominion. The “caliph,” or 
successor, who sometimes holds spiritual authority, rules the caliphate.8 The leader of 
ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared himself “caliph” in early 2014 after the taking of 
the Iraqi city of Mosul. Baghdadi aims to expand his “caliphate,” which currently 
extends roughly from northwestern Syria to Fallujah in central Iraq, to include all 
territory from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf.9 In an audiotaped message, al-
Baghdadi also announced that ISIS intends to conquer countries in the West.10  
ISIS and American Security Interests  
  ISIS threatens United States’ interests in the Middle East for several key 
reasons. The US and most of the world depend on Middle Eastern oil and gas, and 
disruptions in the flow of oil from the region could destabilize the global economy. ISIS 
clearly threatens this supply of oil. In August 2014, ISIS forces advanced on the Iraqi 
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city of Erbil, the capital of the Kurdish regional government and the administrative 
center of its oil industry. Global energy companies worth trillions of dollars have 
invested in Kurdistan, which accounts for about a quarter of Iraq’s oil industry.11 If ISIS 
militants were to seize control of Erbil, they would significantly disrupt Iraqi oil 
production and threaten global access to oil.  
ISIS is already in control of numerous oil fields throughout Iraq and Syria, 
which experts estimate may produce 25,000 to 40,000 barrels a day, worth a minimum 
of $1.2 million in the underground market.12 If the United States must protect the flow 
of oil from the Middle East to ensure the stability of the global economy, it must take 
both military and diplomatic efforts to diminish the presence of ISIS as well as to 
protect major oil fields in the region. 
 The United States also has a direct security interest in dismantling terrorist 
networks in the Middle East that threaten American lives. Al-Baghdadi, in an audio 
statement addressing ISIS in January 2014, warned the United States that soon they 
would be targeted.13 As of November 2014, ISIS had released the brutal beheadings of 
three American journalists. While intelligence experts claim that ISIS does not pose an 
immediate threat to the American homeland,14 there are numerous reasons to believe the 
group will pose such a threat to in the long term.  
  ISIS “foreign fighters,” non-Arabs from the United States and other Western 
nations, could return to their home countries after becoming more radicalized while 
training and fighting in Iraq and Syria. These individuals could then attack Western 
civilians, including Americans. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that ISIS has 
around 15,000 foreign fighters and a relatively small number of these fighters come 
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from France, Germany, Britain, and the United States. Experts estimate over one 
hundred American-born citizens have joined ISIS.15 Although these numbers are 
relatively low, the 9/11 attacks demonstrate the potential of only a small number of 
terrorists to kill thousands of innocent civilians, damage the economy, and traumatize 
the US and the world. If ISIS gains strength in Iraq and Syria by consolidating its 
control over new territory, more foreign fighters will be attracted to its ranks. ISIS has 
developed a significant presence on social media platforms, which it uses to recruit 
fighters in Iraq, Syria, and throughout the world.  The group has used videos to widely 
publicize its recent military victories throughout Iraq, attracting more foreign fighters to 
its ranks.16 The US must use military and diplomatic efforts to dismantle ISIS in order 
to ensure the safety of American citizens abroad and at home.  
 The growing strength of ISIS also seriously threatens to spread its violent 
ideology throughout the Middle East. As mentioned earlier, an estimated three percent 
of the Muslim population adheres to Salafism. A much smaller percentage of this group 
supports the radical political goals of ISIS. However, ISIS will draw more of these 
Salafi Muslims as it becomes stronger and publicizes victories. Some Salafists believe 
they have a religious obligation to support ISIS after al-Baghdadi’s announcement on 
June 29th declaring himself a “Caliph” over the newly established Islamic Caliphate. 
Even if a small percentage of Salafi Muslims pledged allegiance to Baghdadi, ISIS 
would gain the support of tens of thousands of Muslims in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
Nigeria, and every other Sunni Muslim country.17  
US security is threatened by the spread of violent Salafism throughout the 
world, as it could energize and empower other radical jihadist groups that can threaten 
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the American homeland. In November 2014, an Egyptian militant group, Ansar Beit al-
Maqdis, pledged allegiance to ISIS and al-Baghdadi.18 In the future, it is possible these 
groups may carry out attacks in the name of the Islamic State, which may include 
targeting Americans throughout the world.  
  ISIS also threatens the stability of the Middle East. ISIS has directly expressed 
its desire to dissolve all political boundaries and conquer its neighboring states in order 
to expand the Caliphate. The spread of ISIS throughout the Middle East would threaten 
United States allies, including Israel, and could lead to catastrophic and destabilizing 
conflicts in the region. Given these immediate and long-term threats, it is imperative 
that the United States takes action to diminish ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and its strategy 
must be analyzed in the context of sectarian violence and US involvement for the past 
decade in Iraq.  
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III. US FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SUNNI-SHIA CONFLICT IN IRAQ  
 The Iraqi population consists of a variety of religious sects. The overwhelming 
majority of the population is Muslim, and of these 32 million people, around 60% are 
Shia Muslim and 35% are Sunni Muslim.19 The Sunni-Shia divide in Islam occurred 
immediately after the death of the Prophet Mohammed in 632 A.D. Sunni Muslims 
accepted the appointment of Abu Bakr, a close friend of the prophet, to be the leader of 
the Muslim Empire. Shia Muslims, on the other hand, believed the selection of Abu 
Bakr as a successor to Mohammed was a coup d’etat. They believed that the successor 
of Mohammed must be from his immediate family and that it should have been Ali, the 
cousin and son-in-law of Mohammed. Sunni and Shia Muslims have been warring with 
each other since the death of Mohammed.  In AD 656, the first Muslim civil war broke 
out in Iraq between the Partisans of Ali, the Shia, and the Party of Uthman.20 
 Although the conflict concerns theological differences, the Sunni-Shia conflict 
has largely been about political power and regional interests. While the vast majority of 
Muslim believers respect fellow Muslims regardless of their particular sect, areas of 
political instability and extremism foster sectarian hatred and violence. While Iraq has 
been plagued by sectarian violence for centuries, I will begin with the more recent 
history of the Sunni-Shia conflict under the rule of Saddam Hussein. Hussein rose to 
power in Iraq in July 1979. A decade earlier, in 1968, Colonel Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr 
successfully overthrew the government and established the Baath party as the dominant 
political actor in the country. Saddam Hussein, Colonel al-Bakr’s cousin, played a 
leading role in the suppression of Bakr’s political enemies,21 often through torture or 
executions.  
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Through a series of political maneuvers, Hussein managed to marginalize al-
Bakr and forced him to resign in July 1979. Initially, Hussein’s Ba’ath party consisted 
of members of his extended family. He was a Sunni Muslim, born and raised in the 
Albu Nasr tribe in the Sunni triangle,22 and so Iraq became a Shia-majority country 
ruled by a Sunni leader. Until the US invasion in 2003, Hussein and the Ba’ath party 
ensured that the majority of the Shia population were marginalized and excluded from 
the government. Throughout his rule, Hussein targeted Shia religious leaders and 
indiscriminately killed Shia followers. Shia resentment would eventually lead to a 
rebellion after the 1991 Gulf War, but Hussein’s military brutally cracked down on 
these Shia rebels, killing tens of thousands of people.23   
 In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq based on intelligence reports 
suggesting that Hussein had developed weapons of mass destruction. United States’ 
leaders including President Bush and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld believed that 
Hussein’s regime had ties with al-Qaeda and could provide the militant group with 
WMDs that could then be used against the United States. The United States’ strategy to 
deal with this Iraqi threat consisted solely of a short-term plan to remove Saddam 
Hussein’s regime.24 Astonishingly, the United States strategy did not take into account 
the sectarian violence and resentment that had plagued Iraq for thousands of years, and 
its actions would only worsen these sectarian tensions.  
 Following its "successful" invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Hussein's regime, 
the United States, the United Kingdom and their allies established an interim entity led 
by Americans to run the country until a new provisional Iraqi government could be 
established. They established the “Coalition Provisional Authority” as a transitional 
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government.25 On May 16, 2003, Paul Bremer, as the Chief Executive of the CPA, 
issued a directive calling for the “de-Ba’athification” of the Iraqi government.26  
 The Iraqi Ba’ath Party was a hierarchical organization with six tiers. The top 
three levels of the Ba’ath Party consisted of Saddam Hussein, his immediate family, his 
advisors and key regime officials. Had Bremer’s “de-Ba’athification” directive only 
removed these top three tiers, a very small number of Iraqis would have objected. 
However, Bremer decided that de-Ba’athification would include the fourth tier, which 
effectively disenfranchised tens of thousands of ordinary Iraqis who had joined the 
party in order to obtain better jobs.27 These Iraqis included doctors, engineers, 
university professors and civil servants. In just one order, the entirety of Iraq’s Sunni 
elite class was disenfranchised and humiliated. Sunni tribes began to worry that the 
United States intended to marginalize the Sunni population in Iraq, which led many 
Sunnis to join the growing insurgency opposed to the US occupation.28 
 Bremer made another decision that further fueled the rise of an insurgency. On 
May 23, 2003 he disbanded all Iraqi government departments that had a role in security 
or intelligence.29 The Americans felt it necessary to disband the departments developed 
by Hussein and the Ba’ath party for purposes of regime control since many were 
responsible for horrible acts of violence against the Iraqi people.30 However, Bremer’s 
directive also disbanded the entire Iraqi Army, a force of hundreds of thousands of 
mostly Sunni soldiers and officers.31 Many of these soldiers and officers would 
eventually form the core of the Sunni insurgency. 
 Despite US directives removing the Ba’ath party and disbanding the Iraqi 
military, many Sunni leaders still believed that the United States would incorporate 
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them in the government.  This optimism stemmed from the fact that Sunnis had more 
government experience than any of the other groups in Iraq.32 Sunnis also believed that 
it was not in the interest of the US to establish a government dominated by Shia and 
Kurdish groups, since most of these groups were connected to Iran. Sunni tribal leaders 
in the provinces of Anbar, Ninevah and Salah al-Din urged former Baathist members 
and ousted members of the former Iraqi military to wait for the United States’ next 
move before committing to joining the insurgency.33  
 Meanwhile, the insurgency had begun to develop. After the US invasion, 
ultraconservative Sunni jihadists from throughout the Middle East began to cross into 
Iraq. The most powerful of these groups were al-Qaeda and Tawheed wa’al Jihad, 
founded by Jordanian native Abu Musab Zarqawi.34 Tawheed wa’al Jihad would 
become a precursor to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. While in Iraq, Zarqawi 
planned and conducted numerous suicide bombings against Shia militias and civilians 
as well as US coalition forces. This jihadist group had two main objectives: to wage a 
sectarian war against Shias in Iraq and work to end the US occupation through constant 
attacks on coalition forces.35   
 The United States’ official backing of the Iraqi Interim Governing Council, the 
Iraqi government established by the Americans in July 2003, convinced many moderate 
Sunnis to join the insurgency. The majority of the Council was made up of Shia 
politicians with highly sectarian views, and the Sunni political elite was largely 
excluded from the body.36 Also, US forces failed to reach out to Sunni tribes for nearly 
a year after the occupation, and the Coalition Provisional Authority did not engage with 
tribal leaders until May 2004.37 These developments convinced Ba’athist officials, the 
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Sunni majority, and many tribal leaders that the United States intended to marginalize 
the Sunni populace. This led many moderate Sunnis, including former military Ba’athist 
officials, to tolerate and in some cases cooperate with radical jihadist groups such as 
Tawheed wa’al Jihad.38 
 The formation of the interim government led the majority of Sunnis to distrust 
the United States and suspect that it intended to marginalize the Sunnis in Iraq and 
empower the Shia throughout the region. This perception of the Sunnis, along with 
incidents of US abusing Iraqis, fed the insurgency.  On November 26, 2003, four 
soldiers put an Iraqi general, Abed Hamed Mowhoush, into a sleeping bag, sat on him, 
and rolled him around the floor.39 At an outpost near Fallujah, soldiers would “blow off 
steam” by beating prisoners until they passed out or collapsed.40  
 Al-Qaeda and other radical jihadist groups gained support from many Sunni 
tribes. Tawheed wa’al Jihad provided Sunni communities with guidance and protection, 
and Zarqawi assured Sunnis that they were performing their religious duty by fighting 
coalition forces. These jihadist groups also used propaganda to win the allegiance of 
Sunnis, claiming that the Americans were working with the Shia and Iran to expel 
Sunnis from Iraq.41 Zarqawi capitalized on Sunni resentment from their removal from 
the government and the formation of a Shia-dominated government. By 2004, Zarqawi 
and his group became notorious for conducting dozens of deadly suicide bombings of 
Shia mosques, schools, cafes, and markets throughout Iraq. In October 2004, Osama 
Bin-laden officially endorsed Zarqawi and Zarqawi renamed his group “al-Qaeda in 
Iraq (AQI)”42 However, it is important to point out that al-Qaeda in Iraq was not 
actually a precursor or partner with al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the global al-Qaeda 
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responsible for the 9/11 attacks had different ideologies and employed different tactics. 
In 2005, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri would criticize Zarqawi’s tactics, claiming 
that Zarqawi’s attacks against Shias distracted jihadists from their most important 
enemy, the United States.43     
 Al-Qaeda in Iraq succeeded in igniting a sectarian civil war in 2004 that would 
wage for two years. In March 2004, suicide bombers and mortars targeted the Shia holy 
city of Karbala, killing 181 people and wounding several hundred.44 From that point, 
AQI increased their number of attacks against Shia civilians. In response, Shia militias 
and the Iraqi Security Forces would kill hundreds of Sunnis, claiming they were 
responsible for the bombings.45 On February 22, 2006, Al-Qaeda in Iraq bombed the 
Shiite Askiriya shrine, leading to an explosion of sectarian violence. Shia militia 
members formed “death squads” and assassinated hundreds of Sunnis. The 
assassinations conducted by Shia groups accounted for more than four times as many 
deaths in March as bombings and other mass-casualty attacks, according to military 
data.46 After the installation of the new government led by Prime Minister Ibrahim al-
Ja’afari in early 2005, the Shia-dominated Iraqi military frequently and brutally 
retaliated against the Sunni populace. Zarqawi’s strategy was simple yet effective: incite 
the Iraqi government to retaliate against the Sunni populace, so that Sunnis had no 
choice but to support al-Qaeda in Iraq.  
 From 2004 to 2006, AQI drastically increased its presence in Sunni areas of Iraq 
and by 2005 controlled many areas throughout the “Sunni Triangle.” The Sunni 
Triangle, the area between Baghdad in the south, Mosul in the north, and Rutba in the 
east, where most of Iraq’s Sunni population resides, consists of hundreds of small and 
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medium-sized tribes as well as a dozen large tribal federations.47 However, after the 
early post-invasion years, Sunni tribes and the general populace began to feel 
disillusioned with and threatened by al-Qaeda in Iraq. Zarqawi viewed himself as 
“caliph,” or a spiritual leader, and AQI began to impose its harsh interpretation of 
Sharia Islamic law on Sunni communities. Al-Qaeda in Iraq members would force 
families to provide food and shelter and make families marry their daughters to suicide 
bombers. They would force divorces for wives they desired and prohibited drinking 
alcohol or smoking cigarettes. AQI extremists would brutally murder anyone they 
perceived as deserving or disobeying orders. Sunni tribes began to view al-Qaeda in 
Iraq as a significant threat.48 
 Once Sunni tribes viewed al-Qaeda in Iraq as an enemy, they began to fight AQI 
militants in an attempt to regain control of their territory. In Anbar Province, tribal 
leaders recruited police officers and led operations against al-Qaeda in Iraq.49 Sheik 
Abdul Sattar Abu Risha led what became known as the “Anbar Awakening.” American 
forces facilitated recruitment for the police force, and local tribesmen coordinated with 
Americans in securing areas and restarting the economy. The Iraqi government 
officially supported the Anbar initiative, as the Interior and Defense Ministries funded 
and equipped Iraqi Security Force (ISF) recruits from Anbar Province. The Anbar 
Awakening was largely effective at eliminating AQI extremists from the province.50  
 Inspired by the success of this initiative, the United States started the “Sons of 
Iraq” program. In February 2007, US General David Petraeus, the commander of 
American forces, started the Sons of Iraq Program in the cities of Diyala and 
Baghdad.51 The program aimed to replicate the success of the Anbar Awakening in 
 18 
James Kelly 19 
eliminating al-Qaeda and restoring security. As part of the program, the United States 
paid Sunni tribesman to fight AQI. Unlike Anbar, the provinces in which the “Sons of 
Iraq” program operated were ethnically heterogeneous. In Baghdad, Salah al-Din, 
Diyala, and Ninevah, the Iraqi police were Shia-dominated and often committed 
sectarian violence against Sunnis.52 Sunnis in these ethnically mixed areas viewed the 
presence of Americans as a buffer against such sectarian attacks. Unlike in Anbar, Sons 
of Iraq members were not interested in improving their relations with the Iraqi 
government. Rather, Sunni fighters who joined the Sons of Iraqi Program wanted to get 
a regular paycheck, ammunition and weapons, and fight AQI to secure their home 
areas.53 
 The Sons of Iraq program, combined with deployment of an additional 20,000 
American troops in 2007, was effective in drastically diminishing the presence of al-
Qaeda throughout Iraq. By the end of 2007, AQI forces throughout Iraq had been 
decimated by over 70 percent, from 12,000 to 3,500. By 2009, Al-Qaeda in Iraq was 
effectively defeated as an army.54 The remaining members of the group consisted of al-
Qaeda militants, some Sunni tribesmen, and former members of Saddam Hussein’s 
Ba’athist military.55 It appeared as if the al-Qaeda that had terrorized Sunni provinces, 
killed American soldiers and Iraqi security forces and carried out suicide bombings 
against Shia civilians for the past eight years had finally been defeated.  
 In the spring of 2011, a civil war broke out across the border in Syria. An armed 
rebellion developed after President Bashar al-Assad violently cracked down on 
nationwide peaceful protests. The surviving remnants of al-Qaeda in Iraq took 
advantage of the resulting breakdown of the Syrian state. In the summer of 2011, the 
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new leader of AQI, Abu al-Baghdadi, sent fighters into Syria to join the opposition in 
fighting al-Assad.56 In Syria, AQI was able to regain strength, recruit members, and 
spread its message. Within twelve months, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, now calling themselves 
the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant”, was the most powerful rebel group in the 
country fighting Assad’s regime.57 
 In Iraq, Prime Minister al-Maliki’s decisions had continued to alienate and anger 
the Sunni populace. During the Anbar Awakening, Maliki promised that Sunni fighters 
involved would be incorporated into the Iraqi state security structures. On September 4, 
2008, al-Maliki issued an executive order officially naming the Awakening fighters 
“Sons of Iraq” and called for the integration of its members into Iraqi state structures by 
the end of 2009.58 In reality, Maliki and the Iraqi government never intended to 
incorporate the Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi security apparatus. As the United States 
increasingly drew down its forces, Maliki proceeded to dismantle the Sunni militias 
formed during the Awakening.59  
 In late 2011, Maliki began to accuse and persecute Sunni members in the 
government. The Prime Minister ordered the immediate arrest of Vice President Tared 
Hashimi, the most senior Sunni politician in the Shia-led government, after hearing of a 
supposed terror plot planned by Hashimi’s bodyguards. Hashimi fled and his 
bodyguards were tortured until they presented false confessions about planning to attack 
Shia civilians.60 In 2012, Maliki arrested thousands of Sunni, claiming they were 
attempting or planning to subvert the government. Simultaneously, Shia militias were 
roaming through Sunni areas, killing anyone they deemed suspect.61 Bodies of Sunni 
civilians could be seen strewn everywhere on a daily basis. In response to Maliki’s’ 
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sectarian agenda, thousands throughout the Sunni Triangle began to demonstrate and 
demand political inclusion. In late 2012, hundreds of thousands of Sunnis assembled in 
Fallujah and Ramadi.62  At the same time, thousands of Shias gathered in counter 
demonstrations and expressed their approval of Maliki’s policies in Basra, Naja, Babel, 
and Baghdad.63 
  After establishing a dominating presence in Syria, ISIS moved back into Iraq. 
This reflected its grand ambition to establish an Islamic caliphate, or Muslim empire. 
ISIS members began espousing their radical message at peaceful Sunni protests against 
Prime Minister Maliki. In April 2013, a peaceful Sunni protest in Hawisha was attacked 
by the Iraqi Army, leaving hundreds of innocents killed. This event led hundreds of 
formerly moderate Sunnis to join the ranks of ISIS.64 The brutality of Maliki, the Iraqi 
Army, and Shia militias convinced the Sunni population that they needed to be prepared 
to defend themselves and fight for their rights.  
Unfortunately, the only group in the country willing to fight for these Sunnis 
was ISIS, which began to grow in numbers and steadily take over more territory in Iraq. 
In July 2013, ISIS conducted an attack on Abu Ghraib prison and released 500 
prisoners. This formidable attack involved a sophisticated coordination of ground forces 
and artillery,65 and emboldened ISIS forces to seize control of the key cities of Fallujah 
and Ramadi. The battle for Ramadi only lasted a few days, and it was clear that ISIS 
was far stronger and determined than the Iraqi Security Forces. With this realization, 
ISIS launched an offensive on the northern city of Mosul in June. The local Sunni 
population of Mosul viewed the Iraqi Security Forces stationed to defend against ISIS 
as a Shia militia.  Without support from the local population, most Iraqi Security Forces 
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troops fled without a fight. This shocked the US, since the ISF force consisted of around 
10,000 soldiers and the ISIS force had only around 800 militants.66  
ISIS quickly conquered more territory heading south along the Tigris River, 
capturing Qayyarah, al-Shirqat, Hawijah, and Tikrit. During this expansion, ISIS 
committed numerous atrocities, including the massacre of thousands of Iraqi Security 
Forces. ISIS has brutally executed thousands of Shia Muslims and Iraqi Security Forces   
throughout its advance in Iraq.67 In deciding its next moves, the United States must take 
into account the past ten years of sectarian violence and radical jihad in Iraq. The 
following section will look at the United States strategy in combating ISIS in Iraq. 
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IV: US STRATEGY AGAINST ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA 
On September 10, 2014, President Obama stated the objective of the United States: to 
degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS through a comprehensive counter-terrorism 
strategy.  The strategy to achieve this objective has three major parts:  
• The United States is conducting air strikes on ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria. 
These airstrikes have stopped the advance of ISIS fighters in many areas by 
forcing them to conceal themselves. These airstrikes have also damaged or 
destroyed oil refineries, weapons depots, and communication centers in Syria. 
According to General Ray Odierno, the US Army Chief of Staff and a former top 
commander in Iraq, the goal is that these airstrikes will give the Iraqi military 
time to increase its size and capabilities.68 After this has been accomplished, US 
airstrikes will provide support for Iraqi forces conducting offensive missions 
against the Islamic State. 
 
• The United States has deployed hundreds of service members to Iraq to support 
Iraqi Security Forces and Kurdish forces with training, intelligence, and 
equipment.  
 
• The United States plans to support Iraq’s efforts to establish “National Guard” 
units to help Sunni communities secure their own freedom from ISIS control.69 
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V: THE AIR CAMPAIGN SUPPORTING IRAQI FORCES/TRAINING 
IRAQI TROOPS 
 
American airstrikes began in early August after ISIS announced its plan to 
massacre the Yazidis, a Christian minority in northern Iraq, and advanced on Erbil, the 
capital of the Kurdish Autonomous Region. President Obama ordered airstrikes to 
prevent the massacre of Yazidis on Mount Sinjar as well as to protect American 
diplomats, civilians, and military personnel stationed in Erbil.70 The US military 
worked closely with Kurdish and Iraqi forces in this campaign, and from early August 
through November 19, the US Air Force has conducted a total of 1,006 airstrikes, 561 
against targets in Iraq and 445 in Syria. The US flew 843 of the missions and its 
coalition allies flew 163. The airstrikes have hit more than 2,300 ISIS targets, including 
700 ISIS-occupied buildings, 380 fighting positions, 260 vehicles and 180 “black 
market oil-related targets.”71 Aided by US airstrikes, Kurdish forces recaptured the 
towns of Mahmour and Gweyr from ISIS control.72 In mid-August, US airstrikes helped 
Kurdish and Iraqi forces retake control of the Mosul Dam from ISIS militants.73 In early 
September, with the help of US airstrikes, the Iraqi army recaptured the Haditha dam 
from ISIS fighters.74 In October, 10,000 ISIS troops headed from Mosul towards 
Baghdad.  On October 12, ISIS came within 15 miles of the Baghdad airport and the US 
deployed Apache attack helicopters and successfully fended off the attack.75  
The US has conducted strikes throughout ISIS-controlled territory in Iraq, 
hitting Fallujah, Ramadi, Haditha, al-Qaim and other ISIS-controlled areas.76 In 
November 2014, President Obama sent an additional 1,500 US troops to help train Iraqi 
army soldiers and militia fighters to fight ISIS on the ground. A total of 3,000  
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American troops will work at four training centers, helping recruit soldiers for the Iraqi 
Army by providing training, supplies and help with strategy and logistics. The US 
military plans to improve these Iraqi forces until they are capable to go on offensive 
operations and the United States will provide close air support for these operations.77  
The United States is also providing weapons and supplies to militia forces in Iraqi 
Kurdistan. The Central Intelligence Agency is providing light arms and ammunition to 
the Kurdish Peshmerga militia.78  The United States has about 40 Special Operations 
advisers in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdish regional government, stationed at a “joint 
operations center” established to coordinate intelligence and targeting against ISIS 
forces.79  
An Analysis of the Air Campaign and Training Iraqi Forces 
The Iraqi Security Forces 
 After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the United States spent seven years 
training and supplying the new “Iraqi Security Forces” leading up to the withdrawal of 
US troops in 2011.  In early 2009, the ISF was comprised of over 500,000 members. 
The three divisions of the ISF were the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Police, and the National 
Police. The Iraqi Army was under the command of the Ministry of Defense and the 
National Police force was under the command of the Ministry of the Interior. The Iraqi 
Police was recruited and deployed within local communities.80    
 In the seven years after the overthrow of Hussein, the ISF steadily became a 
more effective, professional force capable of fighting the remainder of the insurgency. 
However, by the time of the US withdrawal in 2011, the ISF was deeply divided on 
sectarian lines. The Army and Police were fragmented, with some soldiers loyal to Shia 
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militias and others loyal to Sunni tribes. The ISF also under-represented the Sunni Arab 
population.81 Although the ISF had a number of problems, the US believed that the ISF 
could succeed against an internal threat of mid- to low-level insurgency.82  
After the US withdrawal, the condition of the ISF quickly deteriorated largely 
due to the actions of Prime Minister al-Maliki, who harbored a deep distrust of the 
Sunni population throughout his term. His close relatives had been targeted and tortured 
by Hussein’s security forces. Driven by a seemingly constant paranoia, al-Maliki 
removed many Sunni members of the ISF and replaced them with Shia leaders of his 
choosing. He reneged on his promise to incorporate many Sunni members of the “Sons 
of Iraq” into the ISF.83 Al-Maliki also relied heavily on sectarian Shia militias, often to 
persecute innocent Sunni. He created his own personal security departments that were 
uncoordinated with the Defense or Interior Ministries and unsupervised by the Iraqi 
Parliament.84 
 To have any chance to stop the advance of ISIS, the United States must address 
the problems that have plagued the Iraqi Security Forces. The US needs to limit 
sectarian divisions within the ISF and ensure that it represents both Sunnis and Shias, 
by first incorporating more Sunnis into the ISF.  The areas under control of the Iraqi 
government, including Baghdad and southern Iraq, have a significant number of Sunnis. 
In Baghdad, about 35 percent of the population is Sunni.85 The US must make it clear to 
the Iraqi government that they must allow the Sunnis into the ISF, and that air support 
and troops on the ground for training will only be provided if this criterion is met.  
The incorporation of Sunnis into the Iraqi Security Forces is essential if it is to 
be effective in conducting offensive operations against ISIS-controlled territories with 
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large Sunni populations. For these operations to be successful, it is crucial that Iraqi 
forces have the support of a significant portion of the Sunni population. A major reason 
why the ISF was unable to defend Mosul from ISIS forces in June 2014 was because the 
ISF force did not have the support of the population as most of the majority Sunni 
population in the city viewed the ISF as a glorified Shia militia.86 This perception was 
reinforced by the misguided efforts of the ISF stationed at Mosul. Iraqi National Police 
frequently detained local citizens and set up intrusive checkpoints in order to prevent 
militants from maneuvering about the city.87 These actions further alienated the 
population.  
The incorporation of Sunnis into the ISF will also increase the probability that 
the force will be willing to fight ISIS and secure areas formerly under ISIS control. The 
majority of the cities under ISIS control consist of predominately Sunnis. An ISF 
consisting of a significant amount of Sunnis will be more willing to fight ISIS in Sunni-
dominated territories. Sunnis should be incorporated into the Iraqi Police Service that is 
responsible for enforcing the rule of law and providing local security. This force will be 
essential in working with the Iraqi population in securing areas after they are captured 
from ISIS.   
 The United States must also ensure that the new Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-
Abadi recognizes the legitimacy of the Minister of the Defense and the Minister of the 
Interior. In October 2014, Iraqi lawmakers approved the appointment of Khaled Al-
Obeidi as Iraqi Defense Minister and Mohamed Al-Ghabban as Interior Minister.88 The 
recognition of a proper chain of command will limit sectarian divisions in the ISF as 
well as allow for independent decision-making and innovation.   
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 The United States must also take action to limit corruption throughout the Iraqi 
Security Forces. In the past, leadership at the division level used their positions to extort 
soldiers of lower ranks, as many officers saw their units as businesses with revenues to 
be tapped rather than combat units. Many officers pocketed the money they were 
supposed to provide their soldiers, forcing some soldiers to purchase their own food and 
water from civilian markets and cook their own food.89 Rampant corruption decreases 
morale and reduces soldiers’ willingness to fight. The absence of American boots on the 
ground will make limiting this corruption difficult, but US troops advising and training 
security forces can put in place departments assigned with limiting corruption 
throughout the ISF. Through its training and educational efforts, the US should also 
emphasize the importance that the capabilities of the ISF are not compromised by 
corruption.  
Shia Militias and the Iraqi Security Forces 
 The increasing role of Shia militias in Iraq is one of the most complicated 
factors in the US strategy to provide air support for Iraqi ground forces against ISIS. 
Shia militias have been a major force in Iraq since the US invasion in 2003. The 
overthrow of Hussein allowed many of these Shia militias to increase their involvement 
throughout the country, and during the insurgency some of these militia attacked US 
and government forces and inflicted significant casualties.90 In April 2006, US officials 
stated that Shia militias “posed the greatest threat to Iraqi security and would be the 
most daunting and long-term challenge for the Iraqi government.”91  
After the US withdrawal in 2011, Prime Minister al-Maliki relied on pro-
government Shia militias to arrest and kill Sunnis suspected of subversion. After the ISF 
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retreated in the face of ISIS forces, Shia militias stepped up to fill the resulting power 
vacuum.92 As of November 2014, a number of Shia militias are leading the attack 
against ISIS forces. After the fall of Mosul in June 2014, Shias throughout Baghdad and 
the southern cities of Iraq took up arms in preparation for a fight. The Iraqi government 
is forced to rely more heavily on Shia militias with the growing threat of ISIS and the 
weak state of the Iraqi Security Force. Shia militias have demonstrated both the 
willingness and capability to fight the Islamic State.93  
The situation is further complicated by the fact that many of the strongest Shia 
militias are backed by Iran. For example, the Iranian-backed Badr Organization has 
taken a powerful role in protecting Baghdad. The new interior minister, Mohammed 
Ghabban, is a prominent Shiite politician associated with the Badr Organization. 
However, Hadi al-Amiri, head of the military wing of the Badr organization, will likely 
hold the most power in the Ministry of the Interior.94 Al-Amiri has effectively made his 
Shiite militia indispensable to the Iraqi government. After the fall of Mosul, Amiri took 
his men to defend the north of Baghdad, in Diyala province.95 Many Shia militias, some 
of them Iranian-backed, have successfully fought back ISIS advances. Shiite militias 
such as Saraya al-Salam and Asai’b ahl al-Haq have pushed back ISIS militants from 
the town of Jurf al-Sahkr, located between Baghdad and Karbala.96 There have been 
some instances in which the United States provided air support for Shia militias 
conducting offensive operations against ISIS positions. United States officials claim 
that they have not coordinated directly with Shia militias. However, United States 
leaders are well aware that Shia militias have been fighting alongside the Iraqi Security 
Forces.  
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 The United States needs to help the Iraqi government incorporate Shia militias 
into the Iraqi Security Forces. Ideally, the United States would not allow Shia militia 
fighters into the Iraqi Security Forces, because the ISF needs to be viewed by the Iraqi 
population as representing both Sunnis and Shias. Due to the history of Shia militia 
involvement in sectarian violence, their presence in the ISF could threaten their 
credibility among the population. However, Shia militia members are desperately 
needed to fight ISIS. Even with the help of the US, the ISF does not have the manpower 
and the capabilities to effectively conduct offensive operations against the well-armed, 
battle-hardened ISIS forces.  
Shia militia fighters must be incorporated into the ISF so it has the strength to 
successfully fight ISIS. However, given their reputation for sectarian violence, it is 
imperative that Shia militia fighters are placed in units that include Sunnis. The local 
Sunni populations will be more willing to support these ethnically mixed units. Also, 
the incorporation of both Sunnis and Shias in the ISF will help ease sectarian tensions. 
In early November 2014, Sunni tribesmen joined forces with Shiite militias and Iraqi 
Security Forces in order to recapture the ISIS-controlled city of Hit in Anbar province. 
The process of working together to fight a common enemy may help facilitate 
reconciliation between the two groups. Another reason why Shia militia fighters should 
be incorporated into the ISF if possible is that it will increase the ability of the US and 
the Iraqi government to control these Shia militias. Currently, the ISF and the United 
States does not have the capability to fight Shia militias as they have done in the past. 
The US should help the Iraqis to incorporate these militias into the ISF in order to 
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increase their influence on these groups while harnessing their experience and 
capabilities.  
 A serious concern is that the Shia militias will continue to perpetrate horrible 
crimes against the Sunni population, preventing reconciliation and inciting more 
violence. Already, Shia militias have reportedly beaten, tortured, and killed Sunnis in 
retaliation for the mass murders by ISIS.97 The United States cannot provide air support 
for a Shia force that commits genocide against Sunnis, and this must be made clear to 
the new government. This type of sectarian violence allows for the rise of radical 
jihadist groups.  
Without American troops on the ground, preventing Shia forces from 
committing acts of violence will prove challenging. However, the United States can 
take actions to limit this possibility. First, the United States should try to recruit and 
organize ethnically mixed forces to conduct operations in Sunni-dominated areas. These 
forces will have ties to the population and will be less likely to demonize the Sunnis in 
the area. The United States should also threaten to cut off air support, supplies, and 
weapons if Shia forces indiscriminately kill Sunnis. It must be made clear to the new 
interior minister, Mohammed Ghabban,that it is in his strategic interest to ensure that 
Shia forces do not kill Sunni civilians. The killings of Sunnis will only fuel an 
insurgency against Shia forces and prolong the conflict.  
 
“The Surge” and the Fight Against ISIS 
 In 2007, President Bush ordered the deployment of an additional 20,000 US 
troops into Iraq. These troops were tasked with degrading al-Qaeda in Iraq, protecting 
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the local population, and training Iraqi Security Forces for the impending US 
withdrawal. An examination of the “Surge” and the fight against AQI sheds light on the 
current US strategy to destroy ISIS by providing air support for indigenous Iraqi forces.  
 The United States was significantly more military involved in fighting al-Qaeda 
in Iraq than they are today in fighting ISIS. The fight against AQI involved the 
coordinated counter-insurgency efforts of 130,000 American troops, almost 90,000 
Sunni tribesmen and hundreds of thousands of Iraqi security forces. The role of 
American military action in decimating AQI varied depending on the nature of the 
province. In areas that were ethnically and sectarian mixed such as Baghdad, Diyala, 
and Salah al-Din, U.S. military presence and operations played a crucial role in 
eliminating AQI and securing the area.98 Ramadi, located in central Iraq, is the capital 
city of Anbar Province and has a population of around 400,000 people. By the summer 
of 2006, AQI had a major presence in Ramadi, as it and other insurgents prevented the 
government from functioning through constant attacks on government buildings and 
employees. The 1st Brigade of the US Army’s First Armored Division and other US 
units partnered with Iraqi security forces and conducted numerous successful 
counterinsurgency operations in Ramadi from June 2006 to February 2007.99 US and 
Iraqi forces conducted targeted raids against high value targets, used air strikes to kill 
military commanders, and raided an al-Qaeda meeting and captured 48 suspects. After 
largely clearing Ramadi of AQI insurgents, the US Army, Iraqi security forces and 
Sunni tribesmen continued to conduct numerous neighborhood sweeps in north-central 
Ramadi to retain control of the area.100 This essential pattern was replicated in areas 
under AQI’s control.  
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 By contrast, ISIS today has significantly more fighters, weapons and money, and 
holds more territory, than AQI at the time of the US “Surge” in 2007. ISIS is estimated 
to have double the number of fighters under its command than did AQI. In 2005, it was 
estimated that AQI consisted of around 12,000 to 15,000 fighters, with an estimated 120 
foreign fighters per month joining from neighboring countries.101 According to the 
Central Intelligence Agency, ISIS today has between 20,000 and 31,500 fighters in Iraq 
and Syria, and the number of “foreign” militants is estimated at 12,000, from 74 
countries.102 During its sweep through areas of Iraq and Syria, ISIS stole hundreds of 
millions of dollars’ worth of weapons and military equipment from Iraqi and Syrian 
military installations. These weapons include heavy weapons such as tanks and armored 
vehicles, as well as thousands of weapons supplied by the US government to Iraq and 
by Russia to Syria.103 
 Without American boots on the ground, Iraqi ground forces will have to defeat 
ISIS militants and conduct counterinsurgency operations to secure captured areas. This 
will be very difficult, as the “surge” of 20,000 US troops was critical in reversing the 
trend of violence and degrading AQI. Former US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker 
wrote, “Iraqis certainly deserve credit for this transformation; but it would not have 
happened without the intensive, sustained, US engagement, particularly by those in the 
military who carried the surge forward.”104 This task is made more difficult by the fact 
that ISIS controls much more territory than did AQI in 2005. During the time of the US 
surge in 2007, AQI’s support was limited to the Sunni minority of Western Iraq.105 This 
consisted of only 20% of the Iraqi population in only four of the eighteen provinces. 
Since January 2014, ISIS has rapidly increased its control of territory throughout Iraq. 
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As of November 7, 2014, ISIS controls huge parts of northern Iraq, including the cities 
of  Sinjar, Mosul, and Baiji. ISIS also controls Fallujah and the surrounding area, as 
well as the western province of Rutba.106 Considering these factors, it will be a 
challenge for Iraqi Security Forces to successfully conduct offensive operations against 
ISIS with only US air support.  
 However, there are some reasons for optimism. The United States is advising 
and training Iraqi Security Forces so that they become capable of employing US 
strategies that were successful from 2007 to 2010. The surge of US troops in 2007 was 
accompanied by a strategy shift called “clear and hold.” After United States and Iraq 
forces would clear an area of AQI insurgents, they would remain in the area and keep it 
clear of insurgents while building connections with the local population.107 Iraqi 
Security forces, if they consist of both Sunnis and Shias, will likely have an easier time 
winning the support of the local population than did the Americans. This is especially 
the case in ethnically mixed areas, such as Salah al-Din, Diyala, and Baghdad. 
However, the ability of the ISF to win the support of the population and fight remaining 
ISIS fighters will hinge on whether they refrain from targeting the Sunni populace.  
 The goals and nature of ISIS also work in favor of the US and the Iraqi 
government. ISIS’s strength comes from its effective military force and its ability to 
spread its ideology among disaffected Sunnis. However, the ideology and political goals 
of ISIS also make it vulnerable. Unlike AQI, ISIS seeks to build a new nation as the 
basis for its “Caliphate.” In areas under its control, ISIS operates a security force that 
regularly detains and kills people suspected of subverting their cause. In Mosul, ISIS 
members enforce taxes on a variety of commercial activities and force students to pay 
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additional monthly taxes.108  ISIS may have difficulty maintaining harsh control over 
the local population while fighting a formidable force of Iraqi forces and American air 
strikes. This will make it difficult for ISIS to fund its operations.  
ISIS’s advanced military force, which now includes captured tanks and 
Humvees, will be less able to engage with Iraqi forces in open combat due to the threat 
of American airstrikes. ISIS fighters will be forced to engage Iraqi Forces from close 
range. The precision of American airstrikes will allow the US to hit ISIS targets even in 
cities. As ISIS has expanded, it requires more lines of communication. These exterior 
and interior lines of communication are vulnerable to attack by Iraqi and US forces. 
ISIS has also relied on projecting images of its military victories to gain support, an 
effective strategy during its rise since 2012. However, if ISIS suffers military defeats in 
the future it will hurt their claims of dominance and their ability to recruit. US and Iraqi 
forces must work together to exploit ISIS’s vulnerabilities.  
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VI: NATIONAL GUARD UNITS 
 The United States and the Iraqi government plan for the Iraqi National Guard to 
be a provincially organized auxiliary force. Local Sunni tribal militias would be 
incorporated into the larger Iraqi Security Forces, and serve as local reserves under the 
control of provincial governors. Some experts estimate that the total strength of the 
National Guard could be between 120,000 and 200,000 members.109 As of November 
2014, the Iraqi government has met with leaders from the Dulaym, Shammar, Anaiza, 
Jubour, Hamdan, and Aqaidat tribes to discuss the plan for a National Guard Force.110  
The plan has been met with some support. Numerous groups from ISIS-controlled areas 
have agreed to join the National Guard, including 5,000 Sunni tribesmen from Kirkuk. 
On October 13, 2014, the Anbar Council announced the formation of the first Anbar 
National Guard Brigade made up of 2,000 volunteers.111 On October 22 2014, Prime 
Minister Abadi approved the formation of the Ahmad Sadak Al-Dulaym Brigade, 
named after a former police chief killed by an ISIS attack on October 12. The United 
States has been in contact with more than 20 tribal leaders in Anbar. A representative of 
General John Allen, the US official leading the anti-ISIS campaign, met with Ahmed 
Abu Risha, a longtime U.S. ally in Anbar Province, Hamid Shokah, a leader of the Albu 
Dhiyab tribe, and Rafe’ Abdul –Karim Al-Fahdawi.112 
 
National Guard Units: Analysis  
  The US and Iraqi government sponsored plan to create Sunni National Guard 
Units is essential in the overall strategy to degrade and ultimately destroy the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria. Even with over a hundred thousand forces on the ground, the 
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United Sates was not able to effectively fight al-Qaeda in Iraq until Sunni tribesmen 
became involved in the Anbar Awakening and the US-funded Sons of Iraq program. It 
is imperative that the United States works with the Iraqi government to win the support 
of Sunni tribes in the fight against ISIS.  
 In the past three months, the United States and Iraqi government have made 
progress in reaching out and building connections with Sunni tribes. However, the 
majority of Sunni tribes have not demonstrated a desire to work with the United States 
or Iraqi government to fight ISIS militants. This is due to a number of reasons.  
 First, ISIS and its predecessor organizations conducted a systematic killing of 
former Awakening members and tribal leaders beginning in 2009. Since 2009, at least 
1,345 Awakening members have been killed by ISIS militants. In Jurf al-Sakhar, south 
of Baghdad, 46 Awakening members were killed between 2009 and 2013.113 ISIS’s 
brutal killing and intimidation campaign has eliminated the Sunnis most capable to lead 
a resistance against the jihadist group.  
 These systematic killings have also made it difficult for the United States and 
Iraqi government to find and connect with Sunni leaders. However, the United States 
has extensive relationship and intelligence within Sunni communities due to its 
involvement in the Anbar Awakening and Sons of Iraq Program. The United States 
should identify which US officers and non-commissioned officers had ties with certain 
tribal leaders and reinvigorate these relationships.114 
 A second reason why the majority of Sunni tribes have not fought against ISIS is 
because they lack manpower, supplies, and weapons. In late October 2014, the town of 
Al-Zwaiha was forced to surrender to ISIS fighters. Jalal al-Gaood, one of the tribal 
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leaders the US has been in contact with, recalled how the attacking ISIS force had 
around 200 fighters and about 30 armored trucks.115 The tribal fighters were running 
low on ammunition and food and were forced to escape while the rest of the tribe 
surrendered. Tribal elders from Al-Zwaiha reached out unsuccessfully for help from the 
United States and the Iraqi government.116 Poorly equipped Sunni tribes are incapable 
of defending against well-trained and equipped ISIS forces.  
 The United States must provide weapons, supplies, and funding to Sunni tribes 
through the Iraqi government. The Iraqi government should provide Sunni tribes with 
US provided funds, weapons, and supplies. In November 2014, the Pentagon asked 
Congress to approve a $1.62 billion package of weapons, ammunition, body armor, 
trucks and medical kits for the Iraqi Army, Kurdish forces, and Sunni tribes.117 This is a 
crucial beginning step, however only $24 million of this package will be given to Sunni 
tribes. When the United States funded the Sons of Iraq Program from 2007-2010, the 
US paid Sunni fighters monthly salaries and provided fighters bonuses for capturing or 
killing al-Qaeda militants. In areas where the security situation was relatively good, 
Coalition funding for Sons of Iraq fighters primarily served to provide them with much 
needed jobs.118 According to a local sheikh, the United States paid Sunni fighters in 
certain areas to give these men a job and a way to provide money for their families. This 
served to keep these same Sunni fighters from joining the insurgency while protecting 
the American and civilian population in the area. By January 2009, the United States 
government had invested more than $400 million in the Awakening program.119 The 
United States must be willing to invest at least a hundred millions dollars in order to 
fund Sunni National Guard Units. 
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 By providing money, supplies, and weapons to the Iraqi government for Sunni 
tribesmen, the US can also help dissuade Sunni fighters from joining the ranks of ISIS. 
The Islamic State makes an estimated $1 million to $2 million dollars a day just from 
the oil fields and refineries under its control in Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, the Islamic State 
controls oil fields that produce an estimated 25,000 to 45,000 barrels of oil a day. ISIS 
also collects taxes and extorts local populations under its control.  
 With these millions of dollars in revenue, the Islamic State has been able to pay 
its fighters a relatively high salary. ISIS is reported to be paying its members the 
equivalent of around $400 a month.120  This has attracted hundreds of local Sunni 
tribesmen especially in the Sunni tribal areas where employment is difficult to find.  
Sunni tribesmen will be less willing to join ISIS if they are given an alternative way to 
make money and support their families.  
 A major obstacle to the success of the National Guard Strategy is that it must 
involve deals between Sunni tribes and the Iraqi government.121 This is problematic 
because the sectarian policies of Maliki eroded the trust between Sunni tribes and the 
Iraqi government. Also, the Iraqi government is still dominated by Shia political parties 
and led by a Shia prime minister. In order to win the support of Sunnis, the Iraqi 
government must take significant action to increase Sunni representation within the 
government. Iraqi lawmakers appointed Khalid al-Obeidi, a Sunni member of 
parliament, to be the defense minister. This was a crucial step towards the process of 
Sunni integration.122 Through this appointment, Abadi has demonstrated his seriousness 
about Sunni inclusion. However, these promises must be followed by more efforts by 
Abadi and the Iraqi government to meet Sunni demands. The Iraqi government should 
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make it clear that Sunni tribes will have the option for more autonomy. The al-Maliki 
government illegally cut off numerous initiatives aimed at transforming some Sunni 
provinces to regions.123 By reinvigorating these options, the Iraqi government can gain 
the support of Sunni tribes.  
 Another potential problem with the Sunni National Guard Strategy is that it 
limits how much leverage the Iraqi and US government have over Sunni tribes.  During 
the Awakening movement, the US exploited intertribal conflicts in order to incite 
individual tribes to turn against al-Qaeda.124 The United States was a broker, rewarding 
tribes that served US interests while cutting off support and fighting those that worked 
with al-Qaeda. The National Guard strategy requires that that the Iraqi government offer 
a abroad accommodation to Sunni tribes as a whole.125 Since any tribe could 
theoretically join the National Guard force at once, the Iraqi government and the US 
would lose its leverage over individual militia units.126 It is true that the Sunni National 
Guard strategy will make it difficult for the US and Iraqi government to exploit 
intertribal conflicts. However, by offering a broad accommodation to Sunnis, the Iraqi 
government is increasing the likelihood that Sunni tribes will turn against ISIS. This is 
because ISIS has established such a dominating presence in Sunni areas. Sunni tribes 
understand that successfully fighting ISIS will require cooperation amongst numerous 
Sunni tribal factions. The fight against ISIS can unite formerly adversarial tribes. A 
single Sunni tribe will be more likely to turn against ISIS if it is confident a broader 
Sunni force will also join the fight.     
 The biggest obstacle preventing the Iraqi government from fully supporting 
Sunni National Guard Units is the fear that these Sunni forces could pose a threat to the 
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government.  Experts estimate that the National Guard could potentially grow to 
120,000 to 200,000 men.127 This force would be significantly larger than the 
Awakening force and could pose a threat to the Iraqi Security Forces and the regular 
police and army. Although the Iraqi Security Force at the start of 2014 numbered 
730,000, its numbers have decreased due to combat losses and desertions.128 The ISF’s 
notorious poor leadership and corruption increase the credibility of the potential threat 
of Sunni National Guard Units.  
 Given the rise of ISIS in 2014, the Iraqi government is understandably hesitant 
to provide weapons, supplies, and salaries to a large Sunni force that could potentially 
threaten the Iraqi Security Force and the government. However, the Iraqi government 
recognizes that defeating ISIS requires the cooperation of a substantial Sunni fighting 
force. Thus, the Iraqi government is forced to pick between two bad options. Given the 
immediate threat posed by ISIS, the Iraqi government will likely be forced to accept the 
formation of Sunni fighting units. Also, the potential threat posed by these Sunni units 
is lessened as the ISF gains strength. President Obama’s decision to double the number 
of US troops, from 1,500 to 3,000, assigned with training and supplying the Iraqi 
Security Forces lessens the potential threat of Sunni forces. This fear of the Sunni 
National Guard may also serve as a powerful incentive for the Iraqi government to take 
meaningful steps to include Sunnis in the political process. Sunni inclusion in the 
government will reduce the likelihood of Sunni National Guards fighting the 
government down the road.  
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VII: CONCLUSION 
 ISIS poses an immediate threat to the stability of Iraq and the entire Middle 
East. If left alone, it is likely that ISIS will pose a serious threat to the United States 
homeland and European nations. Given these threats, the United States must take action 
to fight ISIS in the Middle East. The US strategy, although far from perfect, recognizes 
that the best way to fight ISIS is to allow the Iraqi government and Iraqi forces to take 
the lead. As much as United States’ leaders want to believe they can control events in 
Iraq, the reality is that the Iraqi people will decide the future of Iraq. Ultimately, it is up 
to the Iraqi people to decide their fate. As ISF operations and American air strikes 
increase, ISIS will likely begin to lose some territory. After this occurs, the fate of Iraq 
rests largely on Prime Minister Abadi and the Iraqi government. Iraq can only achieve 
peace if the Iraqi government incorporates the Sunni population. Abadi will have to take 
a risk and trust the Sunni population for the civil war to come to an end. Meanwhile, the 
United States must be willing to accept a stronger Iranian presence in Iraq. Defeating 
ISIS will involve numerous Shia militias, many of which are backed by Iran. Given the 
numerous threats posed by ISIS, it is in the security interest of the US to allow for this 
stronger Iranian presence if it means the degradation and ultimate defeat of the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria.   
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